Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)

Ross Cressman
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

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Ross Cressman : Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution):

0 of 3 people found the following review helpful. What we can say seriously about dynamic games?By Edoardo AngeloniThe importance of this text is the way about Cressman makes the evoluzionary model. His game theory talks

about the difference between cooperative and non-cooperative case and the mathematic part is specific for the computation of stability.

Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.The book offers a synthesis of current knowledge about extensive form games from an evolutionary perspective, emphasizing connections between the extensive form representation and dynamic models that traditionally have been applied to biological and economic phenomena. It develops a general theory to analyze dynamically arbitrary extensive form games and applies this theory to a range of examples. It lays the foundation for the analysis of specific extensive form models of behavior and for the further theoretical study of extensive form evolutionary games.

"The first hundred pages of this book form the best and most elegant introduction to evolutionary game theory I have ever come across. What follows is an admirable monograph on extensive form games, an essential part of game theory which has so far resisted invasion attempts by evolutionary methods. Under Cressman's assault, the citadel has fallen. This superb achievement is a landmark in the development of evolutionary game theory."--Karl Sigmund, Faculty for Mathematics, University of Vienna"Biological evolution can only be understood by thinking in terms of population. This book helps us to think in terms of linguistic populations. The vast array of examples and models offers a wealth of tools for understanding the dynamics of the subtle interplay between language evolution and language learning."--Karl Sigmund, Faculty for Mathematics, University of ViennaAbout the AuthorRoss Cressman is Professor of Mathematics at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada.